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ASYMPOSIUM ON ENDING WARSEnding Wars: The Jus ad Bellum Principles
Suspended, Repeated, or Adjusted?
Janina Dill“War does not determine who is right, only who is left.” Bertrand Rus-
sell’s diagnosis that wars’ endings rarely reflect considerations of justice
describes a reality implicitly endorsed by conventional just war theory.
If belligerents encounter the same moral restrictions and are permitted
the same actions in war regardless of the moral justifiability of their re-
sort to force, no necessary connection exists between who should win
and who actually wins. Advocates of the independence between jus ad
bellum and jus in bello ðbelligerents on both sides may conduct themselves
in the same way independent of whether they have a just causeÞ are
therefore often also advocates of suspending moral judgment with re-
gard to the overall justifiability of a war while it is ongoing. Justified
resort to force is restricted, so is conduct in war, but its appropriate end
is determined by the military exhaustion of one side, not by moral prin-
ciple. This is the moral orthodoxy no longer. Revisionist just war theory
considers permissible conduct in war a function of the overall justifi-
ability of a belligerent’s military endeavor. Revisionism is not a precondi-
tion for reclaiming the ending of wars as a matter of morality, but by in-
sisting that ‘who is left’ is to be determined by ‘who is right’, revisionists
have added urgency to the question of when belligerents ought to cease
hostilities.
The present symposium offers two alternatives to the suspension of
moral judgment on when and how belligerents should sue for peace. I
call them the ‘repeated’ and the ‘adjusted’ application of jus ad bellum.
They both argue that the same moral principles guide making war and
making peace and that the criteria which determine whether a bellig-
erent may justifiably resort to force also govern the proper cessation of
hostilities. Both positions further agree that given that the circumstances627
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Athat initially rendered a war just or unjust may change, the justifiability
of the initiation of force does not alone determine the justifiability of its
continuation. At any time during a war, a belligerent requires a moral
reason for the continuation or termination of combat. The subtle dif-
ference between the repeated and the adjusted application of jus ad
bellum lies in whether the principles are thought to have the same im-
plications for the permissibility of starting and continuing a war. The
repeated forward-looking application of jus ad bellum principles treats
decisions to continue hostilities as if they were decisions to resort to
force. From the point of view of the adjusted judgment position, cir-
cumstances that may legitimate a resort to force may not justify sus-
taining a fight and vice versa.
Ce´cile Fabre advocates “sever½ing the ethics of war termination
from the ethics of war initiation.”1 She explores the implications of a
ðrepeatedÞ forward-looking application of the criteria of just cause and
reasonable chance of success. While the lapse of a just cause or the loss
of a reasonable chance of success ðe.g., because the aggressor acquires
new and more powerful weaponsÞ may mean an initially just war has to
be terminated, the existence and realizability of the just cause are de-
termined at the time of the decision to cease or continue hostilities. In
other words, the just aim providing the grounds for continuing a war
“need not be success in obtaining redress for the precise wrongdoing
which provided . . . a just cause for going to war” in the first place.2 Fabre
further argues that, in turn, it may be morally permissible to continue
an initially unjust war once a just cause emerges. By the same token, even
an unjust belligerent does not have to surrender if this will “impair ½its
citizens’ prospects for a minimally decent life” to such an extent that it
would provide a just cause for resort to force, meaning combatants on
the other side are liable to being killed or they may be killed as the les-
ser evil.3 Darrel Moellendorf makes a similar point regarding the crite-
rion of last resort. Even if at the outset of a war the just cause could have
been pursued by nonmilitary means, rendering the war prima facie un-
just, whether a belligerent is morally obligated to terminate the war de-
pends on the availability of peaceful alternatives at that time.
Broad consensus exists among the articles that the standards of just
cause, necessity, and reasonable chance of success need not be adjusted
to take account of a war’s past moral balance sheet when applied to de-
termine its appropriate end. It is the application of the principle of pro-
portionality to the ending of wars that brings to the fore a disagreement
among opponents of suspending jus ad bellum. David Rodin outlines a1. Ce´cile Fabre, “War Exit,” in this issue, 631.
2. Ibid., 635.
3. Ibid., 642.
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Ascenario in which the harm initially judged proportionate in relation to
the just cause pursued has been inflicted without that cause being se-
cured. Yet, at the cost of some extra harm the just cause comes within
reach. If we repeat thead bellum proportionality calculus, only the harm
foreseeable in the future, not the harm inflicted in the past, determines
whether exiting the war is morally required. Rodin considers it a di-
lemma that a belligerent may thus be “permitted to contribute to a proj-
ect that is all things considered morally unjust ½because that project is
morally justified on a forward looking basis.”4 Jeff McMahan fully en-
dorses repeated nonadjusted judgments of ad bellum proportionality, ar-
guing that they are “entirely prospective and harms suffered or inflicted
in the past should in general be ignored.”5 Moellendorf and Fabre, to the
contrary, reject the forward-looking proportionality calculus for war’s
continuation, even though they find it appropriate for the initiation of
force. Moellendorf cautions that not adjusting the application of ad bel-
lum proportionality in this way would “evacuate proportionality of much
of its important critical force, for it renders incomprehensible the claim
that a war is disproportionate because of its cumulative cost.”6
Not all articles in the symposium explore either the repeated or the
adjusted application of jus ad bellum. Daniel Statman’s contractarian pro-
posal rests on a suspension of the jus ad bellum criteria once a war starts.
It reveals the affinity between this position and the endorsement of the
independenceof jus in bello from jus ad bellum. Yet, Statmandemonstrates
that accepting that morality does not vouchsafe that wars’ ends reflect
moral asymmetries among belligerents does not meanmorality has noth-
ing to say about when a war should end. He argues that due to “the enor-
mous suffering brought about by war,” it is justified only “if the benefit
it yields is significant enough.” The benefit he has in mind is a “clear
and durable victory.”7 While this is best secured by the complete annihi-
lation of an enemy, potential future belligerents should in a mutually
beneficial contract accept military victory as a stand-in for complete de-
struction or indeed for the direct and full achievement of their political
goals. It is hence a moral proposition that “the end of war will be deter-
mined by military victory.”8
Like Statman, Gabriella Blum and David Luban consider the mo-
rality of ending wars to be centrally concerned with frustrating bellig-
erents’ tendencies to take a maximalist approach to wars’ ends. Blum
and Luban propose to think about war as an exercise in risk transfer. The4. David E. Rodin, “The War Trap: Dilemmas of Jus Terminatio,” in this issue, 674.
5. Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality and Time,” in this issue, 696.
6. Darrel Moellendorf, “Two Doctrines of Jus ex Bello,” in this issue, 663.
7. Daniel Statman, “Ending War Short of Victory? A Contractarian View of Jus ex
Bello,” in this issue, 720.
8. Ibid., 733.
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Arepeated judgment of its justifiability is then a matter of “risk manage-
ment.”9 Once a state has reduced risk to itself below the threshold of
morally bearable risk, it must exit the war. In turn a state may be justified
in resorting to force if it is threatened beyond this level of morally le-
gitimate bearable risk. As they consider risk distribution to follow a zero-
sum logic so that risk reduction in one actor increases risk in another,
Blum and Luban rule out zero risk ðor any risk below the bearable levelÞ
as a just aim for war or indeed a justification for continuing to fight.
The articles address many acute questions about the morally ap-
propriate termination of wars that transcend the three positions. What
counts as a just aim, when do we know that it was achieved, and how
durable must this achievement be? Whether in tackling these questions
the articles suspend, repeat, or adjust the ad bellum criteria they re-
spectively endorse is significant because it is both reflective and deter-
minative of diverging conceptions of war. The repeated forward-looking
application of ad bellum criteria, whose standards do not yield because
war is already upon us, insists on treating war as a tool for the advance-
ment of justice, a tool that will rarely be appropriate, given the high
costs it imposes, but a tool that, like any other, is judged with a view to
whether it can address an injustice without doing more harm than good.
In contrast, accepting that the internal dynamics of war complicate the
parameters of moral judgment so as to require an adjustment in how
principles are brought to bear must inspire a presumption against the
use of force and may be highly correlated with contingent pacifism. Of
course, even while maintaining a presumption against the use of force
one can still consider war theoretically an instrument for the advance-
ment of justice. In turn, depending on the stringency of one’s ad bellum
criteria, even an endorsement of war as a tool to promote justice may
amount to contingent pacifism. The kinship between the adjusted and
the repeated judgment positions and their respective visions of war is
highlighted by the fact that some articles advocate the adjusted appli-
cation of proportionality while endorsing the repeated application of
other jus ad bellum criteria. The suspended judgment position purports
a different conception of war. If war diverges from peace in such a fun-
damental way that we need to suspend our normal moral principles in
order to determine its appropriate end, then morality’s ambition shifts
from rendering a war the lesser evil to an unjust peace to rendering
morally guided war the lesser evil to war we simply accept as amoral in
nature. In that case, war likely fails as an instrument of justice even if, at
its end, the right belligerent is left.9. Gabriella Blum and David Luban, “Unsatisfying Wars: Degrees of Risk and the Jus
ex Bello,” in this issue, 751.
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